WHY DID MARCOS MOVE VINCE DIZON OUT OF DPWH?

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has reassigned Vince Dizon to the Department of Transportation (DOTr), ending his nearly 14-month stint at the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Giovanni “Banoy” Lopez, who served as acting Transportation Secretary, will replace him. Malacañang announced the exchange on October 26.

According to Presidential Communications Office Secretary Lino Cayetano, Marcos wants Dizon to address commuter problems while Lopez continues the reforms at DPWH. I find the timing interesting. Dizon was appointed to DPWH in September 2025 to help clean up an agency embroiled in the flood-control corruption scandal.

His assignment was to address corruption, fix the department's internal procedures, and restore public confidence in government infrastructure spending. During his tenure, he introduced transparency programs, tightened procurement procedures, and took action against officials and contractors accused of wrongdoing.

But his record also includes serious delays in infrastructure procurement, unfinished investigations, and thousands of questionable entries in DPWH's proposed 2027 budget. So why did Marcos decide to move him now?

THE REASSIGNMENT WAS REPORTED WEEKS EARLIER

On October 7, Politiko reported that Dizon and Lopez could exchange Cabinet positions. Malacañang said it had no information about the reported exchange. Dizon denied it the following day. On October 11, while in Singapore, Marcos was asked whether Dizon would return to DOTr. His answer was: “Well, we’ve talked about it. I don’t know. No, right now it’s a no.” Marcos added that Cabinet assignments could still change.

At the time of the interview, Dizon was not being transferred. Fifteen days later, the exchange became official. Marcos had already acknowledged that the possibility had been talked about, so his October 11 answer was not a categorical denial of any future reassignment. Still, I am curious about what convinced him to proceed. Was there a new assessment of DPWH's progress? Did the situation at DOTr demand Dizon's return?

Or had the exchange been planned for some time? The Palace has explained what Marcos expects from both officials in their new assignments. It has said considerably less about the reasons behind the timing.

WHAT DID DIZON ACCOMPLISH AT DPWH?

Dizon inherited an agency facing allegations of nonexistent flood-control projects, questionable payments, substandard construction, and poor supervision. He took over after Manuel Bonoan resigned in August 2025.

In September, shortly after assuming office, Dizon led the filing of a graft complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against 20 DPWH officials and four contractors accused of irregularities in flood-control projects. The following month, he asked the Professional Regulation Commission to revoke the professional licenses of 20 DPWH personnel linked to the scandal.

Those complaints were concrete actions, although the filing of a complaint does not establish guilt. In November 2025, the government launched the DPWH Transparency Portal. The website opened public access to records covering more than 247,000 infrastructure projects from 2016 to 2025. People could check project locations, contractors, costs, procurement documents, and construction status.

For an agency accused of paying for questionable projects, making these records accessible was a useful change. However, Dizon later acknowledged that some project coordinates were incorrect and that supporting records still needed checking. In February 2026, DPWH introduced its Integrity Chain portal, a monitoring system that allows accredited validators to check infrastructure project information.

Dizon also tightened the screening of proposed infrastructure projects. Engineering offices had to submit more technical documents and show that projects were ready for construction. The department cut its proposed project list for 2027 to 11,395, compared with 25,301 in 2025.

Dizon said the goal was to remove duplicate projects, avoid overlapping work, and stop approving more projects than engineering offices could properly handle. He also reported actions against personnel and contractors. During the September 25 Senate budget hearing, Dizon said at least 61 DPWH employees linked to alleged anomalies had been removed from office.

He reported that 19 contractors had been referred to the Ombudsman and 11 had been blacklisted. By October 19, he said the number of blacklisted contractors had increased to 23. That month, three DPWH officials in Davao City were removed from their posts amid investigations into alleged flood-control anomalies. Another official in Cebu was removed from his position over an extortion allegation.

The figures on personnel removals and blacklisting came from Dizon. I have not independently checked the complete administrative orders or the final outcomes of those cases. The wider flood-control investigation also progressed. By July 28, GMA News Research had documented 26 court cases against 45 individuals and two contracting firms. Dizon cannot take personal credit for every case filed.

The Department of Justice, National Bureau of Investigation, Ombudsman, and other government offices have their own responsibilities in investigating and prosecuting corruption. But DPWH was taking administrative action and cooperating with investigations during his tenure.

What I could not find was a reliable department-wide count of how many previously delayed infrastructure projects were completed, how much the tighter procurement controls saved, or how many disciplinary cases reached final decisions. Those are important figures when assessing the performance of a public works secretary.

THE PROBLEM WITH INFRASTRUCTURE DELAYS

During the August 26 congressional budget hearing, Dizon acknowledged that DPWH was seriously behind schedule. The department had 17,764 national infrastructure projects with an allocation of approximately ₱459.89 billion. As of August 23, contracts worth only ₱146.41 billion had been awarded. That was approximately 32 percent of the allocation.

Dizon cited three reasons: the department could not conduct its usual early procurement because of major changes between the proposed and approved budgets, funding authorizations were released late, and the new screening procedures slowed bidding. These are legitimate administrative obstacles. Project proposals that fail the new checks should not be rushed into construction merely to meet spending targets.

But the delays also affected communities waiting for roads, bridges, drainage facilities, and other public infrastructure. Dizon expected DPWH to award contracts covering more than 80 percent of its projects by the end of September. I could not confirm whether that target was achieved. The latest procurement and project-completion figures would tell us how much progress DPWH made before his reassignment.

The August figures alone cannot establish the department's condition on October 26.

THE 7,107 PROJECTS FLAGGED BY THE SENATE

The proposed 2027 DPWH budget exposed another problem. During the September 25 Senate budget hearing, Senate President Sherwin Gatchalian presented the results of his office's review of DPWH's infrastructure proposals. Of the 11,395 projects reviewed, 7,107 had at least one potential problem. That was 62.37 percent of the projects, with proposed funding totaling approximately ₱251.81 billion.

The Senate review found 189 duplicate project entries, 258 projects that reappeared after being included in the 2026 budget, 3,543 projects without geographic coordinates, and 533 projects that appeared to overlap or had been divided into smaller contracts. Other entries had missing station numbers or bridge identification, unclear descriptions, lump-sum allocations, or conflicting information about the work to be done.

The Senate's red flags were not findings that all 7,107 projects were fraudulent. Dizon challenged the impression that every flagged project had serious deficiencies. He said 6,113 projects had location or identification details in their supporting documents, but the information had been omitted from the project titles submitted for the proposed budget. That left 994 entries needing clarification.

Of those, 347 were lump-sum items that DPWH would have to explain in greater detail. The remaining 647 were referred for joint checking by the Office of the Senate President and the Senate Committee on Finance. Dizon also warned that officials who certified duplicate, overlapping, or double-funded projects could face removal and charges if the violations were confirmed.

His explanation addressed a large portion of the Senate's concerns, particularly those about missing location details. But I have a question. DPWH had already introduced stricter screening procedures. Its engineering offices were supposed to check project documents before submitting them for budget approval. Why did the Senate still find thousands of entries with missing information and possible duplication?

If supporting documents existed, why were important details omitted from the submitted project titles? And for the remaining 647 entries, what did the joint review find? I could not confirm how many of the questioned entries had been corrected before Dizon left.

The department had reduced the number of proposed projects and introduced additional checks, but the Senate findings showed that problems continued in how those projects were prepared and reviewed. That belongs in any fair assessment of Dizon's DPWH record.

THE TAGUIG CONTROVERSY

Dizon also faced questions about alleged ghost flood-control projects in Taguig City. During the September 25 Senate hearing, Senator Alan Peter Cayetano asked whether DPWH had found ghost projects in Taguig. Dizon answered: “Wala po. Sa aming imbestigasyon, wala po.” DPWH Undersecretary Ricardo Bernabe III also told the Senate that the agency had found 107 projects in Taguig, all with documented accomplishments.

Senator Panfilo Lacson challenged Dizon's answer. Lacson cited reports prepared by DPWH inspectors who could not verify the physical existence of some projects that had already been declared completed. One project's billing photographs reportedly had geographic coordinates pointing to Leyte, approximately 600 kilometers away from Taguig.

Lacson also questioned photographs that appeared to have been reused across different project contracts. Dizon later explained that his answer referred to the ten projects nationwide that DPWH had already conclusively classified as ghost projects. None of those ten was in Taguig. He acknowledged that other questionable projects in the city were still being investigated. Dizon denied any cover-up.

Lacson welcomed the clarification but maintained that the inspection findings did not justify ruling out ghost projects in Taguig. I think Dizon could have answered Cayetano's question more carefully during the hearing. His initial answer sounded categorical, especially when DPWH's own inspectors had already raised questions about projects in Taguig.

His later explanation helped distinguish projects suspected of irregularities from those already confirmed as nonexistent. Politiko also published an allegation from an unnamed source that Dizon's relationship with Cayetano had complicated the Taguig investigation. That allegation has not been independently verified, and no evidence has been established connecting it to Marcos's decision to reassign Dizon.

The Taguig investigation was still unfinished when the exchange was announced. Lopez now inherits DPWH's responsibility for addressing those findings.

WHO IS GIOVANNI “BANOY” LOPEZ?

Lopez is a lawyer and certified public accountant who has worked in government finance, procurement, legal affairs, and transportation administration. According to his official biography at the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, he earned his law degree from San Beda College of Law and graduated cum laude in accountancy from St. Paul University Philippines.

His previous government positions include DOTr Director for Legal Service, Assistant Secretary for Procurement and Project Implementation, and Undersecretary for Finance and Chief of Staff. He also served as officer-in-charge Executive Director of the Toll Regulatory Board and Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office.

In February 2025, he became Senior Undersecretary for Administration, Finance, and Procurement at DOTr. When Dizon moved to DPWH in September 2025, Lopez took over as acting Transportation Secretary. His experience with government contracts, spending, and financial controls is relevant to DPWH. But his new assignment extends far beyond procurement.

DPWH has engineering offices across the country, contractors building public infrastructure, projects suffering from delays, and ongoing investigations into questionable spending. Lopez's professional background tells us where he has worked and what responsibilities he previously held. What I would also like to see is an accounting of his performance during his time as acting Transportation Secretary.

Which transportation projects advanced under his leadership? What administrative problems did he fix? Which projects remained delayed? His government experience is documented, but I could not find a detailed performance assessment of his tenure at DOTr. We should not assume that his qualifications alone will translate into success at DPWH.

WHAT DOES MARCOS EXPECT FROM THE EXCHANGE?

According to the October 26 announcement, Marcos wants Dizon to improve daily commuting, shorten queues at the Land Transportation Office, eliminate fixers, and speed up major transportation projects. Lopez has been instructed to continue the DPWH reforms and improve the delivery of roads, bridges, and other public infrastructure. Dizon previously headed DOTr.

Lopez has experience handling finance, procurement, and government administration. I can see the administrative reasoning behind the exchange. What I still want to know is whether Marcos evaluated the results of Dizon's DPWH assignment before deciding to move him.

Dizon leaves behind new transparency systems, stricter project-screening rules, reported disciplinary actions, unfinished investigations, delayed projects, and budget entries questioned by Senate reviewers. Lopez will have to deal with those problems while managing DPWH's regular work.

For starters, DPWH should release updated figures on the projects flagged by the Senate, the contractors blacklisted, the disciplinary cases filed against its personnel, and the status of the September procurement target. We should also know how many stalled projects were completed and which remain unfinished. That would give the public a basis for measuring what Dizon accomplished and what Lopez is expected to finish.

SO, DID DIZON SUCCEED AT DPWH?

Dizon introduced transparency systems, tightened project screening, filed complaints against officials and contractors, and removed personnel linked to alleged wrongdoing. I give him credit for those actions. But the procurement delays were serious. The Senate also found thousands of questionable or incomplete entries in the proposed 2027 budget, even after DPWH introduced stricter screening procedures.

Investigations remain unfinished, and the available records do not give us a complete accounting of infrastructure delivery, final disciplinary decisions, or how well the new controls have worked. Dizon inherited many of DPWH's problems. It would be unfair to blame him for corruption that occurred before he arrived or for the pace of criminal proceedings handled by other agencies.

But he was responsible for managing DPWH during his tenure, and his reforms deserve to be assessed through actual results. I see documented progress in administration and enforcement, alongside delays and unfinished work. I have found no verified evidence that Marcos reassigned Dizon to protect anyone connected to the flood-control scandal.

What I still cannot understand is why the President decided that October 26 was the appropriate time to transfer the cleanup to another official. Marcos appointed Dizon to address corruption at DPWH in September 2025. He has now given that responsibility to Lopez. If Dizon has made enough progress for Marcos to move him back to DOTr, show us the figures.

Tell us what was completed, what remains unfinished, and what Lopez is expected to accomplish. Because after everything exposed by the flood-control scandal, I think the public deserves more than another Cabinet announcement and another round of promises.

PCO official-duty photograph, September 1, 2025; public domain under PD-PhilippinesGov. Cropped/resized; sharing cover adds editorial text and MCT logo. Not a photograph of the October 26, 2026 reassignment.